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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

/
/

Vs.

/

TROY REES,

/

Defendant and appellant.

Case No. 991078-CA

/

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This appeal isfroma bench trial conviction of Possession of a Controlled
Substance with intent to Distribute, a Third Degree Felony in the Second District Court
for Weber County, the Hon. Parley R. Baldwin Presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by virtue of Section 77-18a-l(l)(a)
and 78-2a-3(2)(e), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1999).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE NUMBER ONE
Was the appellant's Constitutional Rights to befreefromunreasonable search and
seizure, under the 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Sec. 14
of the Utah Constitution, violated by permitting an overnight house guest to consent to
the search of the appellant's residence, in the absence of the appellant and without the
consent or knowledge of the appellant?
The standard of review is one of correctness. State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525 (Utah
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App. 1998). This issue was raised in Point I of Defendant's Trial Brief, page 4. The
matter was specifically ruled on by the court in its bench ruling of October 21, 1999.
(Page 3 Transcript of Bench Ruling)
ISSUE NUMBER TWO
Did the trial court commit error in ruling that under Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177, the standard in Utah for a search is reasonable suspicion as opposed to probable
cause, even though the appellant was not on probation or parole.
The standard of review is one of correctness. State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525 (Utah
1998) This issue was raised in Defendant's Trial Brief and the Trial court specifically
ruled on the issue on pages 3 and 4 of the Transcript of Courts Ruling of October 21,
1999.
ISSUE NUMBER THREE
Should the Search Warrant involved in the second search be suppressed do to the
illegality of the initial search and the inclusion in the affidavit of information derived
from the first search. Also there is an issue as to the reckless conduct of the officers in
the preparation of the affidavit.
ISSUE NUMBER FOUR
The initial search without a warrant produced approximately 42.1 grams of
Marijuana and the subsequent search of the safe produced approximately 85.8 grams.
Did the court commit error in ruling that because the combined amount of approximately
128 grams or approximately 4.6 oz of marijuana " is more substantial than one would
normally have for their individual use" was sufficient to prove possession with intent.
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The standard of review is "clear weight of the evidence" State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d
238 (Utah App. 1995). This issue was raised in the Defendant's trial brief and ruled upon
by the court on Page 6 of the Court Ruling of October 21, 1999. (See Transcript)
ISSUE NUMBER FIVE

^

Did the court commit error in not granting defendant's Motion to Dismiss because
the State was allowed to re-file charges after dismissal but without having to make a
showing of new evidence. This issue is related to the Courts holding in State v. Brickey,
714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) but is an argument to extend that ruling. In this case there
were two scheduled preliminary hearings neither one of which the State's witness
appeared for nor did they give any explanation for their failure to appear. The trial court
granted a motion to dismiss after the second failure to appear but then allowed a re-filing
of the charges without any showing of there reason for not appearing. This issue was
argued and denied by the court and renewed at trial. (Trial transcript Page 90 line 15
through Page 91 line6) The Standard of review would be Correctness. State v. Davis,
965 P.2d 525. (Utah App. 1998).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION—FOURTH AMENDMENT
UTAH CODE ANNO. VOL. I PAGE 19
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH—ARTICLE I SEC.14
UTAH CODE ANN. VOL 1 PAGE 106.
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"The Right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall no be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized."
UTAH CODE ANN. TITLE 58-37-13 (2)(i)(iii)
"(2) The following are subject to forfeiture and no property right exists in them:
(i)all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing cultivating,
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled
substances in violation of this chapter, except that:
(i)...
(ii)...
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or
manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing,
or storage facility or interest in real property may not be forfeited
under this subsection unless cumulative sales of controlled substances
on the property within a two-month period total or exceed $ 1,000, or
the street value of any controlled substance found on the premises
at any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer
experienced in controlled substances law enforcement may testify
to establish the street value of the controlled substances for purposes
of this subsection;"
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case, Course and Disposition Below
The Defendant was originally charged in August of 1998 with a Third Degree
Felony; Possession of Marijuana with intent to Distribute and with a Class B.
Misdemeanor of Possession of Paraphernalia. At preliminary hearing the State's
witnesses failed to appear. The Defense moved to dismiss but the Court granted the
State's request to re-set another preliminary hearing. The State's witnesses again failed
to appear and the Court granted a motion to dismiss.
The Defendant was re-charged in February of 1999 with a Third Degree Felony of
Possession of Marijuana with intent to Distribute. Preliminary hearing was held and a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Motion to Suppress was filed and heard. By stipulation the evidencefromthe
Suppression hearing was submitted to the court for consideration along with the evidence
taken at trial. It was stipulated that the Court sitting without a jury could consider all
prior testimony including the preliminary hearing in ruling on the Suppression question.
Following the bench trial, Trial briefs were submitted and on the 21st of October, 1999
the court ruled that the Motion to Suppress was denied and the Court found the defendant
guilty of the Third Degree Felony. Sentence was imposed on the 2nd day of December,
1999 and the court granted a Certificate of Probable Cause pending appeal
At the time of the Suppression Hearing it was agreed that the recordfromthe
Preliminary Hearing, along with the Search Warrant, Affidavit for Search Warrant and
the Testimonyfromthe Suppression Hearing could be a part of the Record. Therefore
references to transcripts used in this brief are as follows: Preliminary Hearing (PH),
Suppression Hearing (SH), the trial (TR), and the Court Ruling on the Motion to
Suppress (CR), Search Warrant Affidavit (SWA)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 7th of August, 1998 Weber County Deputy Sheriff, Chad Barnett went to
the trailer home owned and occupied by the defendant. Officer Barnett was
accompanied by the Mayor of Farr West and was there to look for Mr. Dave Hunt, the
owner of the real property where the trailer was located. They were concerned about a
rezoning issue and business license issue with Mr. Hunt and his failure to be at the City
Council meeting the night before to discuss those issues. (PH 28 & 29).
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When Officer Barnett knocked on the door a female voice (Doreen Atkin) said to
come in. (PH-12) The officer testified that as he entered he could smell recently burned
Marijuana (PH-12) but did not mention the odor to Doreen Atkin while he was in the
house(PH 13). Ms. Atkin did not know if Dave Hunt was around or not but walked
outside with the officer to see if she could see his truck in the area, it was not there. (PH
13). Officer Barnett then asked Ms. Atkin about the odor of Marijuana and she said two
guy came by to see Troy Rees and they were smoking (PH 13 & 14). The two individuals
were never identified.
Ms. Atkin explained to Officer Barnett that she did not live there, and that she had
stayed there the night before because the air-conditioning in her apartment was not
working. (PH -14). When he entered the home at 8:30 AM, Ms. Atkin was laying on the
couch in some bedding material and with a pillow. (TR 24-4). Mr. Rees' bedroom was in
another part of the home. Mr. Rees was not at home and when the officer asked if Ms.
Atkin if he could search the trailer she said "go ahead take a look around." (PH 10-1)
Officer Barnett found 4 Marijuana stems in the garbage (PH 15). He then opened
a cupboard door and took the lid off of a tin cookie box where he found additional
marijuana (TR 33 & 34) that weighed 42.1 grams. (TR 38-18). Troy Rees was called at
that point and told to come home. When Mr. Rees arrived at the home he admitted the
Marijuana in the tin box was his but was for his personal use only. (PH-22). Mr. Rees
never said he gave permission to others to use his Marijuana (PH 22 & 23). Following
the search of the trailer and the conversation Officer Barnett had with the defendant, the
defendant was arrested and the officer informed the defendant that the trailer was seized.
(PH23&24).
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After the trailer was seized the officers found a safe in the trailer and in the
affidavit in support of getting a search warrant for the safe state that "Barnett had found a
large quantity of marijuana inside the trailer" (SWA-2) This "large quantity" description
that was used in the affidavit referred to the 42.1 grams or 1.5 ounces.(TR-38-18)
The affidavit in support of the search warrant did not inform the judge that the
"large quantity" (42.1 Grams) of marijuana use to support the affidavit was located by a
"consent" search from an overnight house guest. The affidavit further employed a seven
year old anonymous complaint to attempt to give the court an unfavorable view of the
defendant. The officers also stated that an anonymous informant said Troy had a large
quantity of marijuana in the safe, but they no basis for that persons credibility other than
to say they have nothing to gain by giving the information. (SWA 2).
Officer Barnett testified about his opinion that the contents of the cookie tin was
for distribution as opposed to personal use. His logic was that 1.5 ounces is more than a
person would possess for personal use; That there were two pipes in the cookie tin and if
it was for use he should only have one pipe; that there was a package of zig zag papers in
the tin and if the marijuana were for personal use he should only have a single zig zag
paper. There were also 3 baggies with residue in the tin cookie tin. (TR 82-7).
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
AN OVERNIGHT GUEST DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO
WAIVE AN OWNER'S 4TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO BE FREE
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A very basic starting point concerning the legality or illegality of a search and
seizure is set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S.
347, 88 S. Ct 507,19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) as follows:
"searches outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
One of those exceptions is the "Consent" exception. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S.624,
66 S.Ct 1277, 90 L.Ed. 1477 (1946), State v. White, Utah, 577 P.2d. 552 (1978).
In State v. Griffin, Utah, 626 P.2d 478, the Utah Supreme Court specifically stated at 480
as follows:
"There should be no question about the propositions: that an officer
may conduct a search if he has obtained the consent of the person
whose property is to be searched."
In the case before the court the person whose property is to be searched did not give
consent to the search.
There are circumstances where it has been held that a third person may possess
the common authority, actual authority or apparent authority, depending on jurisdiction,
to subject the property to search and seizure without the property owner's consent.
These three distinctions will be discussed hereafter.
The Oregon Court, in State v. Will, 885 P.2d 715 (Or. App. 1994) summarized its
holding that the third person must have actual authority to consent to a search, which is a
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higher standard than is required by the U.S Supreme Court. The following quotation is at
page 719:
"[11] In Carsey, the Oregon Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment
rule as stated in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct 988, 39 L.Ed.2d
242, 1974. In Matlock the Court held that common authority to validly consent to
to a search 'rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having
joint access or control for most purposes.' 415 U.S. 171 n.7, 94 S.Ct at 993 n.7.
The Oregon Supreme Court construed that rule to require that the third party
Who consents has actual authority. State ve. Carsey, supra, 295 Or. At 44-46,
664 P.2d 1085. We subsequently found the reasoning of Carsey persuasive
in determining that Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution also requires
actual authority. State v. Lynch, 94 Or. App. 168, 171-72, 764 P.2d 957 (1988).
Although apparent authority is now sufficient under the Fourth Amendment,
see Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed. 148 (1990),
actual authority to grant consent is still required under Article I, section 9.
State v Arnold, 115 Or.App. 258, 262, 262 n. 2, 838 P.2d 74 (1992), rev. den.
315 Or. 312, 846 P.2d 1161 (1993)"

The State of Hawaii continues to use the standard of actual authority. In 1996,
which was six years after Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 177. In a case with a similar
factual basis to the case before this court the Hawaii Court of Appeals observed and held
as follows in State v. Apo, 922 P.2d. 1007 (Hawai'I App. 1996) at 1014:
"[10] 'In order for a consent to search to be valid under article I, section 7 of
the Hawai'I Constitution^ the individual consenting must actually possess the
authority to do so.' Lopez, 78 Hawai'I at 447, 896 P.2d at 903 (footnote added)"
"[11] In the case at bar, the facts in the record do not support a finding that
McCracken possessed 'actual authority' to permit Officer Kaleohano's entry
Into Defendant's living room area. At trial McCracken testified that she had
Her own separate residence at the time on the incident in question. While it
Is clear that McCracken had access to the living room area, there is no evidence
She had Defendant's permission to allow Officer Kaleohano into the living room."

The Colorado Court of Appeals talked in terms of both actual authority and
apparent authority in People v. Walter, 890 P.2d 240 (Colo. App. 1994) but using either
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standard found that a person in the home to tend children did not have either actual or
apparent authority. At 243 the court stated:
"Since the record does not support a determination that the babysitter or
her mother had either actual or apparent authority to consent to a search
of defendant's bedroom, the search cannot be validated based on the
consent of a third party."
Utah appears to follow either "common authority or actual authority" State v
Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, (1991). , Elder, was decided after Illinois v. Rodriquez, supra but
the Utah court did consider it in its decision. At page 1343 the Court in Elder stated as
follows:
"Also well established is the precept that a third person may consent to a
search of another's property if the third person has 'common authority over
or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be
inspected/ United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,171 S.Ct.988, 993, 39
L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). There is no question that Lones purported to consent to the
search of Elder's crawlspace. At issue is whether the trial court correctly
concluded that Lones had the authority to validly consent to such search."
It is also very clear in Utah that officer's concept of "authority" is not a subjective
belief but is an objective finding. In the Court's Conclusion in the Elder case at page 1345
the court held as follows:
"[7] Since Lones did not have actual authority to consent to the search,
and since the officers could not reasonably have believed she had such
authority, we reverse the denial of the motion to suppress evidence
obtained from the crawlspace and remand the case for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.5"
People v. Speer, 540 N.E. 2d 1089, (Ill.App. 2 Dist 1989) addressed the specific
issue of a house guest being able to give a valid consent to search the owner's home. In
that case at P. 1093 the court held as follows:
"We need not decide whether this finding is contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence because under Illinois law, even if Sanchez did
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,10
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consent to the search, it would be invalid because Sanchez did not have
authority to consent. It is undisputed that Sanchez did not live at the
apartment, and there was no evidence to suggest that he was anything more
than a social guest. Thus, he did not possess common authority or have some
other sufficient relationship to the apartment to validate a search by police."
Following People v. Speer, supra The Illinois court had another case involving a
guest and in deciding that case the court also set forth some standards and definitions of
"common authority". The following selective quotes are from page 1209 of People v
Pickens, 655 N.E.2d 1206, (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 1995).
"Common authority is recognized in situations with family, marital, or cohabitant
relationships. ... (various citations)... The third party's degree of authority and
control over the residence cannot be substantially inferior to that degree possessed
by the defendant, and the third party's right to occupy and use the residence
must be equal or exceed the defendant's right of occupation. ... (various citations)
... A social guest does not possess common authority to validly consent to a
search of a residence.... (various citations)... If a guest resides elsewhere, the
guest may not claim an interest in the host's house. People v. White (1987), 117
I11.2d 194, 212, 111 IlLDec. 288, 294, 512 N.E. 2d 677m683."
The State of Minnesota has also addressed the issue of a mere guest not being
allowed to give a valid consent to search. In State v. Miggler, 419 N.W. 2d 81
(Minn.App. 1988) at page 86, the Court held as follows:
"Ordinarily, a mere guest on premises may not give consent to search
the premises when his or her interest is inferior to that of the host. State
v. Hatton, 389 N.W. 2d 229, 233 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)pet. for rev. denied
(Minn. Aug 13, 1986).
Based on the facts of this case and the law set forth herein, Doreen Atkin could
not be deemed to have common authority, apparent authority or actual authority and
could not give a valid consent to search. Officer Chad Barnett either knew she lacked
authority or he should have known.
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At the time Officer Barnett seized the trailer home he had located 42.1 grams of
marijuana. This seizure was beyond the bounds of a legal seizure under Title 58-37-13,
Utah Code Ann.. That Statute, which is set-forth above under Constitutional and
Statutory Provisions, exempts from seizure a home unless the state can show a street
value of in excess of $1,000.00 in controlled substance. By the officer's own testimony
the 1.5 ounces would have a street value of $100.00 per ounce (TR 57-14) or a total of
$150.00.
POINT II
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN RULING THE
STANDARD FOR A CONSENT SERCH WAS REASONABLE
SUSPICION EVEN THHOUGH THE DEFENDANT WAS
NOT ON PROBATION OR PAROLE.
In this case Judge Baldwin made some specific findings as a part of his "Court
Ruling of October 21, 1999. He felt that the citations by the defendant to non Utah
decisions relating to consent being given by a house guest did not apply because those
"States have interpreted their constitutions as requiring different types of authority in
order to waive their Fourth Amendment Rights." (Court Ruling Pages 2 & 3) and that
"The Rodriguez and Davis cases are binding on this court." He was referring to Illinois v.
Rodriquez, supra, and to State v. Davis, 985 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1998).
Appellant herein contends that State v. Davis, supra, is actually and directly in the
appellant's favor. The appellant, Troy Rees was not on probation or parole at the time of
this incident. In the Davis Case there were two defendants, Bradley C. Davis who was on
probation, and Holly H Hyatt who was not on probation or parole. Davis and Hyatt were
living together and in the decision Judge Orme made a specific destinction between the
two defendants based on their respective status. As a probationer Davis had signed a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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probation agreement agreeing to search and seizure based upon reasonable suspicion.
From that standpoint this Court in Davis followed the Rodriguez ruling in the following
language:
"The United States Supreme Court has applied a reasonableness
standard to police conduct in search and seizure cases—a standard
which applies with equal force in probation search cases."
State v. Davis, supra, at 532.
This Court reversed as to the defendant Hyatt in that items found in her Escort
automobile were not shown by the State to be within the "common authority" of Davis in
such a manner as to allow him to waive Hyatt's Constitutional rights and to permit a
search of her vehicle.
It is also clear from State v. Davis at 533 that Utah recognizes the need for a
"common authority" to consent to a search.
"The risk to nonprobationers' Fourth Amendment rights demands
that, when officers conduct a probation search where a probationer
lives with a nonprobationer, the facts available to the officers must
support a reasonable belief that the probationer has at least common
authority."
In this case neither Mr. Rees nor Ms. Atkin were on probation or parole and there
is no evidence that Ms. Atkin had common authority to waive Mr. Rees' rights to be free
from unreasonable search. As set-forth in the Statement of Facts, Ms. Atkin, althought
she had stayed over at Mr. Rees' home on some other occasions, she had her own
apartment and she was merely sleeping on his couch on this occasion because her own air
conditioner was not working.
POINTIII

THE SEARCH OF THE SAFE PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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WARRANT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED
If this court grants the suppression requested in Point 1 above, then pursuant
to the doctrine of "fruit of the Poison tree" no reference can be made in the affidavit to
any items found in the initial search. Therefore there would be no of discussion of
illegal activity in the residence and therefore no basis for the warrant. Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
The appellant acknowledges that a reviewing court give great deference to a
magistrates determination of the content of a search warrant affidavit. United States v.
Leon. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) but under Leon this court can reviewfromthe record evidence
that was not available to the magistrate at the time he signed the warrant. If the officers,
in the preparation of the affidavit were dishonest or reckless in setting forth the
information the magistrate relied upon, the warrant can be suppressed.
The affidavit itself was grossly deficient and misleading to the court, not so
muchfromwhat it said asfromwhat it should have said to properly inform Judge Taylor
of the circumstance prior to its issuance. The affidavit itself is a part of the court record
but a copy is in the addendum to this brief for the court's convenience. In Support of this
contention we draw to the court's attention the following matters.
a. The entry relating to 7-22-91 should not be considered as relevant in that it was
anonymous and there is no way to determine reliability. In addition the report was over 8
years old at the time of the drafting of the affidavit.
b. The affidavit gave no information as to the reliability of the informant that said
the defendant had marijuana in the safe, other than Officer Huemiller's statement to
Officer Burnett that the person had nothing to gain. This is not adequate.
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c. Officer Burnett did not properly inform Judge Taylor as to the items found in
the trailer. The Affidavit stated a "large quantity of Marijuana" The ultimate
determination of quantity as it turned out at trial was only 42.1 grams.(TR 38-18)
d. The issue of the original search ( Consent by a guest) was never mentioned in
the Affidavit. All that was said was as follows: "During the investigation Barnett found a
large quantity of Marijuana inside the trailer that Troy Rees admitted was his. This
statement was completely lacking of any information as to the original entry to the trailer.
e. An issue raised earlier in this brief is the legality of the seizure of he residence
under the provisions of title 58-37-13 (2)(i)(iii). Because of the term "large quantity"
used in the affidavit the magistrate court very well have believed the residence had been
legally seized because the value of the controlled substances exceeded the $1,000.00
threshold required under Title 58-37-13 (2)(i)(iii).
Statements to the court in an affidavit can be deceiving and omissions as stated
above are just as deceiving and as a result should be suppressed.
POINT IV
ARGUMENT ON ISSUE OF POSSESSION VS. POSSESSION WITH
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE.
The State carries the burden of proving intent to sale. The only evidence
presented in court of intent to sale wasfromthe self-serving statements of the overly
suspicious minds of two Narcotics Officers. They, in there wisdom have determined that
anyone possessing 42.1 grams could only possess it for sale as opposed to personal use.
The same is also true of there opinion on the 86.1 grams in the safe. Quantity alone has
never been set out by the legislature as a basis to classify it as being held for distribution.
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In fact the legislature doesn't even classify the possess ii i »l IVLii iniand -is A irliir, basf.1
i

atil the quantity exceeds 16 ounces. Title 58-37-8 (2)(b)(ii) Utah Code Ann.
For the state to meet its burden of proof "beyond a reasonable do ui 111 m r iiisi iin • •«

1

", kvmprk'iil ; .-iilnia' mini1 111 distribute. What is apparent in this case is what the State

did not present. The did not present: (1) scales, (2) money, (3) Customer lists with
names or phone numbers 1 4) confessions oi admissions (5) ahistor) of prior buys in the
last 8 years. In fact the State did not present any evidence that was not consistent with
possession for personal use.
W hat was the basis of Officer Barnett's opinion was: the 1.5 ounces of Marijuana,
That there were 3 baggies with residue in the cookie tin, that the only explanation for a
person to havt

<nd that if a person had a package of zig

zag papers he must be using the marijuana for distribution because he should only have
one paper. (Tr 82- /1 Presumably the officer is suggesting tJiat ,i per si HI bin y ,i tm ka^c i if
ziz zag papers, remove one for use and through the rest of the package away. This logic
truly escapes me.

;, POINTv
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE PERMITTED THE
THE STATE TO REFILE THIS CASE AFTER THE PRIOR
DISMISSAL
The Supreme Court in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) ruled that if a
magistrate dismisses a case at prelin

iw

new evidence before they can re-file. This is not truly a Brickey case, in that the
preliminary hearing was never held in the first place.

'

• • '
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A preliminary hearing was set and the State's witnesses failed to appear or give
the court, the prosecution or the defense any explanation or reason for not appearing. A
second preliminary hearing was set and the same thing happened again. This time the
court granted a dismissal, but then over the objection of the defendant allowed a new case
to be filed and to proceed to trial.
The issue is really, how far can the Strike Force go in ignoring the system. We
have no case law to support a dismissal under the facts set-forth above, but hopefully we
can get some guidelines.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully asks this court to find that an overnight house guest cannot
waive the home owners Fourth Amendment and Article I Sec. 14 rights to befreefrom
unreasonable search and seizure and suppress all evidence seized pursuant to the
"consent" search and the subsequent warrant search.
The appellant further request the court to clarify that State v. Davis does not
change that standard of probable cause in search and seizure cases to one of reasonable
suspicion except in cases where a person is on probation or parole.
In the event the Court does not reverse the trial court on the search and seizure
issues that the court reduce the conviction to a Class B. Misdemeanor possession charge
in that the State did not prove Intent to Distribute.
The appellant further asks this court to review the remedies available when police
officers ignore hearings and give no reasonable explanation for not attending.
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, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
MAILING
I hereby certify, that I mailed two «.'.) u>pK-s ol llm hi id In il» Plaintiff and
\ppdhmi i iv ll S. Mail, prepaid, on this

day of July, 2000 by mailing them to:

Jan Graham, Attorney General
J. Fredric Voros, Jr
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84414

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2 ND DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFIT

TT FOR ST

H WARRANT

The undersigned being first duly S*.M i ni depov:;. ma say *:

.:-:-••

Tnat the affiant has reason to believe that:
That in the vehicle(s) described as:
1990, AJfa, CT, White, TEXAS 5ZK-438, VINS IAW46O25LA0Q1459, A white 5 4 wheel 'type tniilc i « id i
a brown stripe.
In the City ol OGDfcN, Lourity uL W ElilEl'1., 'liui

f I i'l AH, iticr c in i u w fnit.nn pi opcr/ or evidence described
•'

as:

-.

MARIJUANA, a green leafy substance in dried form.
Materials used to package marijuana, specifically, plastic sandwich bags.
• Materials for using marijuana:
1. Cigarette papers, small sheets offlammablepaper with adhesive on one side,
2. Pipes, used to smoke marijuana,
3. Roach clips, used to hold a marijuaria cigarette while being smoked.
• Personal notes,, records or narcotic transactions, listing names, dates, amounts sold.
That said property or evidence:
• Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed.
• Has been used to commit or conceal a public offense.
Will be used to commit or conceal a public offense.
is evidence of illegal conduct
I h : • facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant are:
Your Affiant, Troy Burnett, is a detective with the Ogden City Police Department and has been
employed as a police officer since April of 1996. Your Affiant is currently assigned to the Weber Morgan
Strike Force and have been since December of 1997. Your Affiant graduated from the Utah Police Officer
Standards and Training Academy in September of 1996. Your Affiant has graduated from the Utah Drug
Academy and has had training in the preparation of search warrants, search an seizure laws, narcotics
identification, undercover operations, and confidential informant management. I have been involved in the
preparation and execution of numerous search warrants. Your Affiant has received training and has personnel
knowledge through his experience: through undercover operations and confidential informant management,
of the use, sales and manufacturing of cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana and other
narcotic contraband. Your affiant has knowledge of what items would most often be found at the premise
where there are suspects using, selling or manufacturing any of these drugs and these items arc those that I
have listed in the description of items to be searched for. Your Affiant has received numerous excellent work
Search Warrant Affidavit - Paze I
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awards, as well as being named Officer of Che month and Officer of the year.
On 5/14/90 agent Huemiller arrested Troy Rees after Troy had made arrangements and attempted to purchase
Svc pounds of marijuana form Huemiller. Huemiller had told Troy that he had the five pound of marijuana and
he would sell it to Troy for 55,000.00. Troy left and returned a short time later with the cash. Huemiller then
arrested Troy.
On 7/22/91 an anonymous complainant reported to the Strike Force that Troy Rees was selling marijuana.
On 8/7/98 Deputy Barnctt arrested Troy Rees for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Bamett was
investigating an ordinance violation at 2000 West 2000 North in the city of Farr West, A 5* wheel trailer was
the focus of the violation. During the investigation Bamett found a large quantity of marijuana inside of the
trailer that Troy Rccs admitted that was his. Troy was arrested and the trailer was seized. Agent Jensen
responded and spoke to Troy. Troy told Jensen that he keeps his marijuana locked in his trailer and that he
sometimes gives it (the Marijuana)to his friends. A inventory search of the tailor resulted in the finding of a
locked safe. Bamett had found a key that fit the safe in a tin which held the marijuana that Troy had admitted
that was his, the tin was sitting on top of the safe. The safe requires a key and the combination to open it. Bamett
asked Troy for the combination and Troy denied ever knowing the combination. Bamett did not inventory the
safe prior to it being towed to Ogden Auto. Your Affiant looked trough the trailer prior to it being towed away
and observed green leafy substance, that based on Your Affiant's training and experience had the odor and
consistency of marijuana, scattered though out the trailer. Your Affiant observed a small amount of this same
substance on top of the safe.
Your AfSani contacted Sgt Huemiller and was informed that he had spoken to an individual, who wished to stay
anonymous because he/she feared for their safety, about Troy Rees. Tliis individual stated that Troy has a large
quantity of maryuana stored inside of the safe in the trailer. Huemillcr stated that this individual is a creditable
informant and has nothing to gain by giving this information. Your Affiant contacted Troy by phone, after he
was releasedfromjail, and attempted to get the combination to the safe. Troy stated that he does not know the
combination to the safe and sated that he never has. SgL Huemiller contacted the individual who sold the trailer
to Troy three weeks ago. The individual told Huemiller that Troy was given the key and the combination to the
safe when he purchased the trailer. The trailer in question is being kept at Ogden Auto 2050 Wall Ave.

AFFIANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

'

A*yr* / ^ f
njDcel/

W

IN THE 2 DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
20
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